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KEVIN DIGRAZIA* 
Cyber Insurance, Data Security, and Blockchain in 
the Wake of the Equifax Breach 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We are now in an era where we rely on interconnected smart devices in almost every 
aspect of our lives.1 With the added convenience of being able to access your banking 
information via your smartphone or asking Alexa to order more paper towels, we are 
exposing our personal data to a host of new cybersecurity threats.2 The digital 
revolution has enabled us be a part of a highly interconnected world where we are 
constantly connected to the Internet of Things (“IoT”)3 including things such as 
smart TVs, thermostats, cellphones, cars and even industrial control systems 
(“ICS”).4 By connecting all of these devices and digitalizing troves of sensitive or 
proprietary data, it opens the door for bad actors to perpetrate malicious attacks.5 
The malicious cyber-attacks can come in various forms depending on the intended 
target and the motivation of the hacker, which is why it is no wonder cyber risks are 
one of the biggest threats of our age.6 
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      *     Kevin DiGrazia is a student at The University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, a CPA, and 
a Senior Associate at PricewaterhouseCoopers. The opinions stated in this paper are those of the author and 
should not be attributed either to PwC or to its clients. 
 1. See Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Internet of Things Connectivity Binge: What Are the Implications?, 
PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (June 6, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/06/06/the-internet-of-
things-connectivity-binge-what-are-the-implications/. 
 2. Id.  
 3. 1 MEGAN COSTELLO, DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY LAW § 5:83, WestLaw (database updated June 2017) 
(defining the IoT as “the ever-expanding network of internet-enabled appliances to an already existing 
infrastructure of computers and mobile devices”).   
 4.  ALLIANZ GLOBAL CORP. & SPECIALTY, A GUIDE TO CYBER RISK MANAGING THE IMPACT OF INCREASING 
INTERCONNECTIVITY 27 (Sept. 2015), https://www.agcs.allianz.com/assets/PDFs/risk%20bulletins/CyberRisk 
Guide.pdf. 
 5. See SYMANTEC, 2016 INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT (Paul Wood et al. eds., 2016), https://www. 
symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-21-2016-en.pdf (reporting that smart home devices 
such as TVs and door locks can be hacked similar to industrial control systems and manufacturing plants).  
 6. Insurance 2020 & beyond: Reaping the dividends of cyber resilience, PWC (2015), https://www.pwc. 
com/gx/en/industries/financial-services/insurance/publications/insurance-2020-cyber.html. 
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 With recent high profile cyberattacks like WannaCry and the Equifax breach, 
consumers, regulators and companies should be on heightened alert to our country’s 
biggest vulnerabilities. In the case of the WannaCry attack, hackers were able to infect 
more than 300,000 computers in over 150 countries around the world in a matter of 
several days, including many hospitals, which were unable to access patients’ medical 
records.7 In the Equifax breach, hackers were able to access “people’s names, Social 
Security numbers, birth dates, addresses and, in some instances, driver’s license 
numbers.”8 These two cybersecurity incidents help illustrate the potential 
catastrophic impact that a hacker can have on millions of people around the world.  
 To address these risks, companies have begun purchasing cyber insurance as 
both a standalone policy and as an endorsement to their current policies.9 Cyber 
insurance policies are usually bucketed into two general categories: first-party 
coverage; and third-party defense and liability coverage.10 As discussed below, first-
party coverage may cover the costs of data-breach notifications, credit monitoring, 
and lost profits.11 Third-party liability coverage provides coverage for regulatory 
fines, settlements and judgments against the insured amongst many other coverage 
options.12  
 This note will begin by evaluating how the IoT has evolved and the new risks 
connectivity brings to both businesses and individuals.13 Part III of this note looks at 
how insurance companies have been drafting their traditional insurance policies to 
exclude cyber related liability and the risks businesses and consumers face if they rely 
on their traditional insurance policies for coverage for a cyber-related incident.14 Part 
III also provides a brief overview of the potential benefits of standalone cyber 
insurance policies as a source of protection in the case of a cyber-attack, but notes 
that purchasers of the policy must understand what coverage they are buying because 
of the lack of standardized cyber insurance policies.15 Next, this note will examine the 
silent cyber risk that potentially implicates multiple lines of insurance in the event of 
a large-scale cyber-attack and its impact on the re-insurance markets.16 It will also 
evaluate the use of blockchain technology as an alternative to Social Security numbers 
 
 7. Tyrone R. Childress et al., No More Tears: Insurance Coverage For The “WannaCry” Ransomware Attack, 
22 CYBERSPACE LAW. *1–2 (July 2017).  
 8. Sheena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO. (Sept. 8, 
2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do.  
 9. Michael Rossi, Cyber Liability Issues for Large Companies, IRMI (Nov. 2003), https://www.irmi.com/ 
articles/expert-commentary/cyber-liability-insurance-market-update.  
 10. See infra Section III. 
 11. See infra Section III. 
 12. See infra Section III. 
 13. See infra Section II. 
 14. See infra Section III. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
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as a form of identification in an age where bad actors are easily able to access a 
consumer’s personally identifiable information (“PII”).17 Finally, this note will 
address the current data privacy laws, their effectiveness in protecting consumers, 
and evaluates the potential of model data protection and network security laws.18 
II. IMPACT OF THE IOT ON THE CYBER INSURANCE MARKETS 
A. Current Connectivity of Devices 
The IoT has somewhat of an amorphous definition depending on which scholar or 
government agency is providing the definition. One definition put forth in a 
government report describes the IoT as “an expansion of the global infrastructure 
through existing and evolving interoperable information and communication 
technologies that incorporates the interconnection of physical and virtual systems to 
enable new and automated capabilities.”19 A more reader friendly version of the 
definition from the same report describes the IoT as: 
A decentralized network of objects, applications, and services that can 
sense, log, interpret, communicate, process, and act on a variety of 
information or control devices in the physical world. However, the IoT 
differs from previous technological advances because it has surpassed the 
confines of the computer networks and is connecting directly to the physical 
world.20 
 Although most people have heard of the IoT, most people do not realize how it 
affects them. On the consumer side, some cars, thermostats, baby monitors, 
refrigerators, and anything that is able to connect to the internet is considered a smart 
device. These devices are a part of the IoT and can be a gateway for hackers to enter 
the home. In a 2012 incident, hackers accessed the security cameras sold by 
TRENDnet, accessed the video feeds without passwords, and watched unsuspecting 
victims go about their daily routines inside their homes.21 The Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) brought a case against TRENDnet alleging that TRENDnet 
 
 17. See infra Part V. 
 18. See infra Part VI. 
 19. The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, NSTAC Report to the 
President on the Internet of Things, ES-1, November 19, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/NSTAC/’20Report%20to%20the%20President%20on%20the%20Internet%20ofo20Things%2ONo
v%202014%20%28update%20%20%20.pdf (citing the Industrial Internet Scoping Report issued by NSTAC in 
February 2014 summarizing the work of a subcommittee).  
 20. Id. at 1.  
 21. Kim Zetter, Flaw in Home Security Cameras Exposes Live Feeds to Hackers, WIRED (Feb. 7, 2012, 2:34 
PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/02/home-cameras-exposed/. 
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represented that its products were secure, which was false and misleading, and that 
it failed to take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorized access to the video feeds.22 
In 2014, the FTC issued a final order, which was only an insignificant punishment 
for TRENDnet, prohibiting them from misrepresenting the security of their cameras, 
and requiring them to provide free technical support to their customers for two 
years.23 
 Cyber-attacks on ICS are of paramount concern to our national security and 
viewed as one of the largest risks.24 As operational control technology becomes 
increasingly connected to the internet, it opens the door for bad actors to control 
physical processes.25 ICS are generally defined as the “different types of control 
systems and associated instrumentation, which include the devices, systems, 
networks, and controls used to operate and/or automate industrial processes.”26 They 
can also be found in almost every field imaginable, including manufacturing, food 
and beverage, HVAC management, brewing, and even pharmaceuticals.27 Hackers 
have proven they are able to access ICS as demonstrated in the 2014 incident where 
a spear phishing28 exploit enabled hackers to take control of the ICS of a German steel 
mill and caused massive damage by disabling the regulator that shutoff the furnace.29 
In another example, hackers were able to gain access to the control system of a dam 
in upstate New York through a cell modem. Luckily, the water gates were not 
connected to the system at the time because they were down for maintenance.30  
 
 22. In the Matter of Trendnet, Inc., A Corp., No. 122-3090, 2014 WL 556262, at 4–5 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014) 
(stating that Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §45(a) gives the agency the 
authority to regulate security standards).  
 23. FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges Against TRENDnet, Inc., FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/02/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-against-
trendnet-inc. 
 24. The Role of Cyber Insurance in Risk Management: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Security of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 114th Cong. 9 (2016) (statement 
of Cong. John Ratcliffe, Chairman, S. Comm. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Tech.).  
 25. The Role of Cyber Insurance in Risk Management: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Security of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 114th Cong. 12 (2016) (statement 
of Matthew McCabe, Senior Vice President, Network Security and Data Privacy, Marsh FINRPO). 
 26. See generally Industrial Control System, TREND MICRO, https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/ 
security/definition/industrial-control-system (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (providing a description of ICSs).  
 27. LUCY L. THOMSON, CYBER PHYSICAL RISKS (2016). 
 28. “Spear phishing is an email or electronic communications scam targeted towards a specific individual, 
organization or business. Although often intended to steal data for malicious purposes, cybercriminals may also 
intend to install malware on a targeted user’s computer.” What is Spear Phishing? – Definition, KASPERSKY LAB, 
https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/definitions/spear-phishing (last visited Feb. 12, 2018).  
 29. Hack Attack Causes ‘Massive Damage’ at Steel Works, BBC (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
technology-30575104.  
 30. The Role of Cyber Insurance in Risk Management: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Security of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 114th Cong. 12 (2016) (statement 
of Matthew McCabe, Senior Vice President, Network Security and Data Privacy, Marsh FINRPO). 
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B. Overview of Insurance 
Insurance helps individuals and companies address the inevitable risks they face on 
a daily basis. Insurance, at its most basic level, is an arrangement for transferring and 
distributing risks from one party (usually the insured) to another party (the 
insurer).31 Insurance companies spread risk among a large pool of policyholders by 
collecting premiums from policyholders. In exchange, they cover large risks of loss 
identified by a contract known as an insurance policy.32 The insurability of a specific 
risk is determined by two key factors: the frequency of the risk and the severity of the 
risk.33 Insurance policies are usually designed to cover low-frequency, high-severity 
losses, such as a house fire, or high-frequency, low-severity incidents, such as car 
crashes.34 However, there are some areas — those that are high-frequency, high-
severity risks and those that are unpredictable risks, such as terrorist attacks — that 
pose significant challenges to the insurance industry’s attempt to provide affordable 
coverage to cover those risks.35 
 Businesses and individuals have historically looked to insurance policies to 
transfer or mitigate the future risk of loss.36 However, insurance companies have 
recognized the massive potential liability associated with policies that do not exclude 
coverage for cyber-related incidents and have begun adjusting their standard policies 
to exclude cyber-related coverage.37 Insurance companies realize the cyber insurance 
market is poised for explosive growth, with projections for premiums reaching over 
$20 billion by 2025.38 Because cyber insurance is the future of the industry, insurance 
companies have not completely pulled out of the market, but are taking a much more 
calculated approach to the market.39 Insurance companies have achieved this by 
carefully designing endorsements and exclusions for traditional policy lines, in 
addition to creating standalone cyber insurance policies with very specific definitions 
 
 31. PRACTICAL LAW COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, INSURANCE BASICS FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL. See also AM. 
INS. ASS’N, PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE BASICS 1, www.aiadc.org/AIAdotNET/docHandler. aspx?DocID 
=319988. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:9 (3d ed. rev. 2017). 
 37. See Matt Dunning, Insurers Prepare for Implementation of New Cyber Liability Exclusions, BUS. INS. (Jan. 
1, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20140119/NEWS04/301199978 (noting that the 
Insurance Services Office (ISO) recently revised its commercial liability forms to exclude coverage for many forms 
of cyber related damages).  
 38. ALLIANZ GLOBAL CORP. & SPECIALTY, A GUIDE TO CYBER RISK MANAGING THE IMPACT OF INCREASING 
INTERCONNECTIVITY 24 (Sept. 2015), https://www.agcs.allianz.com/assets/PDFs/risk%20bulletins/CyberRisk 
Guide.pdf. 
 39. PWC, INSURANCE 2020 & BEYOND: REAPING THE DIVIDENDS OF CYBER RESILIENCE 4 (2015), https://www. 
pwc.com/gx/en/industries/financial-services/insurance/publications/insurance-2020-cyber.html. 
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for cyber coverages and exclusions, which include separate limits for different types 
of cyber exposure.40  
III. CYBER INSURANCE OVERVIEW 
A. Policy Basics  
Cyber insurance policies are a relatively new insurance product, especially as a 
standalone policy.41 Based on the type of policy purchased, cyber insurance is 
intended to protect the insured against the costs associated with hacking, cyber-
attacks, and data breaches.42 Cyber policies generally cover first-party losses because 
of a cyber-event relating to responding to a breach, such as legal and forensic costs, 
notification costs, crisis communications, reputational damage mitigation, lost 
profits and operating costs, and cyber extortion.43 Additionally, many policies cover 
third-party liability for failing to protect data, credit card liability, defense costs for 
regulatory actions and fines, and media liability.44 
 The cyber insurance market is a virtual wild west of insurance policies with no 
standardization of coverage or policy language, which makes it almost impossible to 
compare policy pricing and coverage.45 The value of cyber insurance policies is widely 
debated. Some commentators believe that the amount firms have to pay in premiums 
and deductibles for the insurance coverage would be comparable to the amount the 
firm would have to pay out of pocket to cover the costs of the breach.46 To make 
matters worse, the firm may have been able to prevent the cyber-attack had they used 
the money spent on the premiums and deductible to secure their networks.47    
 
 40. Id. at 10.  
 41. Brian D. Brown, The Ever-Evolving Nature of Cyber Coverage, INS. J. (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www. 
insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/2014/09/22/340633.htm (noting that the fist cyber insurance policy 
was written in 1997).   
 42. Sean Harrington, Cyber Insurance: What Minnesota Lawyers Need to Know, BENCH & B. MINN. (Nov. 6, 
2015), http://mnbenchbar.com/2015/11/cyber-insurance/. 
 43. See AIG, CYBEREDGE®: END-TO-END CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS (2015), http://www. 
aig.com/content/dam/aig/america-canada/us/documents/business/cyber/aig-cyberedge0418finalsingle-
brochure.pdf (describing the coverage provided by their “End-to-End Cyber Risk Management Solutions”).  
 44. See CHUBB, CYBER ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT (2017), https://www2.chubb.com/us-en/_assets/doc/ 
17010185-cyber-erm-12.17.pdf (describing the coverage available with their Cyber ERM). 
 45. See SASHA ROMANOSKY ET AL., CONTENT ANALYSIS OF CYBER INSURANCE POLICIES: HOW DO CARRIERS 
WRITE POLICIES AND PRICE CYBER RISK? 35 (2017), http://weis2017.econinfosec.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/3/2017/06/WEIS_2017_paper_28.pdf, for an in-depth analysis of the variations between the various 
cyber insurance policies.   
 46. John Pescatore, BitPay Sues Insurance Company After Cyberattack Claim is Rejected, SANS NEWSBITES, 
Sept. 29, 2015, https://www.sans.org/newsletters/newsbites/xvii/76 (discussing reasons why cyber insurance 
policies may not be the best option for some firms). 
 47. Id.  
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 Others believe that cyber insurance may be a good investment for small to 
medium-sized firms that would be severely affected by a cyber-attack but do not have 
the funds to have IT risk audits and the backend infrastructure to detect or prevent a 
cyber-intrusion.48 In fact, small to medium-sized business are a prime target for 
hackers because they do not have the expertise or the funds that a large company has 
to defend their network.49 As a result, over 50% of small and midsize businesses 
(“SMB’s”) experienced a breach in 2016.50 Congress has acknowledged the threat of 
cyber-attacks on small businesses, noting that “over 60 percent of those [SMBs] 
attacked go out of business.”51 To address this threat, Congress has introduced 
legislation, Making Available Information Now to Strengthen Trust and Resilience 
and Enhance Enterprise Technology (“MAIN STREET”) Cybersecurity Act, which 
would provide small businesses with resources to protect themselves from cyber-
attacks.52 Cyber insurance may also be a valuable investment for large companies, 
especially those with vast amounts of consumer data such as retailers, cloud storage 
providers, companies in the healthcare field, financial institutions, and email 
providers such as Yahoo.53 
 According to a report by Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty, cybercrimes 
cost the global economy “approximately $445 billion a year” and although data 
breaches have been the focus of cyber-attacks in the past, Allianz sees future threats 
coming from “intellectual property theft, cyber extortion and the impact of business 
interruption (BI) following a cyber-attack or from operational or technical failure.”54 
 
 48. See PWC, MANAGING CYBER RISKS IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.pwc. 
com/gx/en/consulting-services/information-security-survey/assets/the-global-state-of-information-security-
survey-2015.pdf (noting that larger companies are heavily investing time and money in safeguarding their 
networks and assets while small companies often do not have the funds or think they are too insignificant to 
attract cyber-attacks). Small and medium sized companies can protect themselves through “managed security 
services” or purchasing cyber insurance. Id. 
 49. SYMANTEC, 2016 INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT (Paul Wood et al, 2016), https://www. 
symantec.com/security-center/threat-report (finding that small and medium sized businesses with 1-2,500 
employees made up 65% of the spear-phishing attacks in 2015 while 35% of the attacks were aimed at companies 
with greater than 2,500 employees).  
 50.  PONEMON INST., THE 2016 STATE OF SMB CYBERSECURITY IN SMALL & MEDIUM-SIZED BUSINESSES (June 
2016), https://signup.keepersecurity.com/state-of-smb-cybersecurity-report/. 
 51. National Cybersecurity Institute at Excelsior College: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Small Business, 
Big Threat: Protecting Small Businesses from Cyber Attacks, 114th Cong. 61 (2015) (statement of Dr. Jane LeClair, 
Chief Operating Officer, National Cybersecurity Institute at Excelsior College). 
 52. Thune Introduces Legislation to Improve Cybersecurity Resources for Small Businesses, JOHN THUNE FOR 
U.S. SENATOR FOR SOUTH DAKOTA (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.thune.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/3/ 
thune-introduces-legislation-to-improve-cybersecurity-resources-for-small-businesses. 
 53. Todd Haselton, Yahoo Just Said Every Single Account was Affected by 2013 Attack — 3 Billion in All, 
CNBC (Oct.4, 2017, 7:50 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/03/yahoo-every-single-account-3-billion-
people-affected-in-2013-attack.html. 
 54. Businesses Must Prepare for New Generation of Cyber Risks, ALLIANZ (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.allianz. 
com/en/press/news/studies/150909_businesses-must-prepare-for-cyber-risks. html/.  
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Insurance companies are trying to underwrite policies to meet the market demand, 
which is growing at a double-digit rate with projections reaching the $20 billion or 
more mark for cyber related insurance policies.55  
B. Coverage Gap Issues  
Firms purchasing cyber insurance should understand what their current insurance 
policies will cover, and what duplicate coverage and peril gaps exist. With the surge 
in automation of the IoT and the Industrial Internet of Things (“IIOT”), hackers will 
increasingly be able to cause physical damage to machinery and other equipment.56 
This poses a challenge for an insured because in most cases, a standard property or 
Commercial General Liability (“CGL”) policy will not cover damages resulting from 
a cyber-attack.57  
 One of the most challenging aspects of understanding cyber insurance policies 
is trying to determine how the untested policy language will affect coverage for 
specific perils in various industries.58 For example, Massachusetts Bay Insurance Co. 
denied coverage in 2015 when the Bitcoin exchange CFO was phished and divulged 
his email credentials to the hacker, which enabled them to fraudulently transfer over 
$1.85 million worth of Bitcoins.59 According to Bitpay, the policy offers coverage for 
“loss of or damage to ‘money,’ . . . resulting directly from the use of any computer to 
fraudulently cause a transfer of that property” and the policy was specifically 
amended to include Bitcoins in the definition of “money” in the policy.60   
C. How Insurance Companies Respond to Risks 
The language in most current CGL policies is based off of the standard policies 
drafted by the Insurance Service Office (“ISO”), Inc.61 The current CGL policies have 
three areas of coverage under Section I, Coverage A – which addresses bodily injury 
and property liability damage, Coverage B which addresses personal and advertising 
 
 55. Cyber Risk 2025 - The Next 10 Years. . ., ALLIANZ (2015), http://www.agcs.allianz.com/insights /expert-
risk-articles/cyber-risk-2025/. 
 56. See generally LUCY L. THOMSON, CYBER PHYSICAL RISKS (2016) (detailing past cyber-attacks on physical 
infrastructure connected to the IoT and the damage the hackers were able to inflict).  
 57. See infra Sections III.C & III.D. 
 58. See infra Sections III.C & III.D. 
 59. Thomas Parry, Bitcoin Processor Sues Insurer for Phishing Attack Coverage, 11 WESTLAW J. INS. BAD 
FAITH, *1 (Oct. 14, 2015). 
 60. Id.  
 61. See ISO, VERISK INS. SOL., http://www.verisk.com/insurance/about/faq.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) 
(“ISO began life in 1971 as Insurance Services Office. While we still serve the property/casualty insurance 
marketplace, our business has expanded greatly. Therefore, in recent years, we have not used the old name in 
most of our communications with customers and others.”).  
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injuries and Coverage C which addresses medical payments.62 The CGL form has 
been in effect since the 1940s and purchased by the majority of businesses to cover a 
wide range of risks, but it was not designed to protect the insured from all risks.63 
Prior to the 1940s, the liability policies, which were the predecessors to the CGL 
policies, were written to cover a specific hazard.64  
 In the 1970s and 1980s, insurance companies had to address the issues of 
asbestos and toxic dumping.65 In asbestos cases, the coverage issue stemmed from 
identifying when the insurance policies were triggered and when they began to 
provide coverage.66 A common example of this is when a factory worker was exposed 
to asbestos for twenty years but did not manifest symptoms until ten years after she 
stopped working at the factory. Over those thirty years, the manufacturer could have 
had five or six different insurance policies in place that could all potentially share in 
the liability years after the policy term had ended.67 After decades of litigation, the 
majority of courts have rejected the manifestation theory of liability and adopted the 
position that the policies in effect from the first exposure through discovery are 
triggered, requiring all insurers that had policies during that period to cover the 
losses.68 This approach also implicated all of the policy limits in place because the 
insurance company could be liable up to the policy’s cap for each year the policy was 
in place creating massive liabilities for the insurance companies many years after the 
policy period ended.69 As a result of the asbestos litigation, the CGL policy was 
updated in 1986 to exclude asbestos related liability.70  
 In the early 1970s, insurance companies began to realize that there was a 
significant increase in pollution-related claims and attempted to limit their exposure 
to this liability by updating the standard CGL policy in 1973 to exclude coverage for 
damage caused by pollution.71 To address rampant unacceptable hazardous waste 
 
 62. INS. SERV. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM CG 00 01 04 13 (2012). 
 63. Lance Bonner, Cyber Risk: How the 2011 Sony Data Breach and the Need for Cyber Risk Insurance Policies 
Should Direct the Federal Response to Rising Data Breaches, 40 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 257, 270 (2012). 
 64. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY: 
INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION COMMITTEE 1–2 (2010).  
 65. Id. at 158–62. 
 66. Id. at 109–25 (discussing the various types of triggers of CGL policies and how they affected the insurance 
companies’ requirements to payout claims). 
 67. Id.; JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL AND KNUTSEN ON INSURANCE COVERAGE 521–22 
 (4th ed. 2016). 
 68. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three Decades 
of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 353 (2006). 
 69. Id. at 376.  
 70. Id. 
 71. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY: 
COVERAGE PROVISIONS, EXCLUSIONS, AND OTHER LITIGATION ISSUES 209 (Peter J. Neeson eds., 1995) (“The initial 
pollution exclusion clause introduced in the 1973 revision to the CGL standard-form policy has become known 
as the ‘sudden and accidental’ pollution exclusion for it disclaims coverage ‘for bodily injury or property damage 
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practices, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), which imposed retroactive, 
joint, and several liability for all parties involved with site hazardous waste 
dumping.72 The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has brought 
enforcement actions against many companies, such as fines and remediation costs 
associated with the companies’ improper disposal or handling of hazardous 
substances.73 As these claims were litigated, insurance companies realized that courts 
were interpreting the “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion differently than 
the drafters had intended.74 To address the increased exposure and mounting claims, 
the CGL form was modified again in 1986 to remove the “sudden and accidental” 
pollution exclusion and replace it with an “absolute pollution exclusion” which 
attempts to expressly exclude almost every discharge of a pollutant.75  
 As will be discussed below in the case of cyber insurance policies, when the 
insurance industry faces a large financial risk such as asbestos litigation or pollution 
related claims, the industry usually creates an exclusion for those specific risks or 
narrowly tailors their exposure to those risks.76 Although insurance companies try to 
limit or eliminate their exposure to risks such as earthquakes and flooding, 
sometimes the government has to step in to either back a program or establish a new 
insurance program. For example, the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”)77 
was established to provide affordable flood insurance to the public because of 
insurance providers pricing flood insurance policies at an unaffordable rate.78  
 Although cyber related insurance coverage is a relatively new idea for 
insurance, the courts and the insurance companies have been litigating the basic 
elements of the policies for at least the past several decades.79 As a result of the 
litigation, the ISO determined it needed to modify the standard CGL form multiple 
times throughout the years to limit the exposure it created for cyber related insurance 
 
arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape’ of pollutants except in circumstances in which the loss 
results from a ‘discharge’ that is ‘sudden and accidental.’”).   
 72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).  
 73. Stephen Mountainspring, Insurance Coverage of CERCLA Response Costs: The Limits of Damages in 
Comprehensive General Liability Policies, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 755 (1989). 
 74. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY: 
COVERAGE PROVISIONS, EXCLUSIONS, AND OTHER LITIGATION ISSUES 209-10 (Peter J. Neeson eds., 1995). 
 75. Id. (“…the absolute pollution exclusion is drafted so as to ‘absolutely’ preclude coverage for pollution 
claims without regard to causation issues or fault of the insured.”).  
 76. See infra Section III.D.  
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 4001.  
 78. R. Jason Richards, The National Flood Insurance Program: A “Flood” of Controversy, 82 FLA. B.J. 8, 9-10 
(2008) (describing the state of the flood insurance market in 1968 which required the government to create NFIP).  
 79. See infra Section III.D. 
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losses similar to the changes made to the language for other possible catastrophic 
exposures in the past.80   
D. GRAY AREA IN COVERAGE 
Prior to the paradigm shift towards the complete digitization of companies, the CGL 
policy was able to adequately provide an insured coverage if there was a physical loss 
of property because at that time, all of the company’s records were physical.81 As 
more and more information became stored digitally, courts had to decide whether 
the loss of use of data would be a physical loss under the CGL policy.82 In 2000, the 
court in American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Company v. Ingram Micro., Inc., 
found that “‘physical damage’ is not restricted to the physical destruction or harm of 
computer circuitry but includes loss of access, loss of use, and loss of functionality” 
where a power outage took down the insured’s mainframe computer and was 
required to reprogram the lost data.83 However, the court in Ward General Ins. v. 
Employers Fire Ins. Co., reached a different conclusion by finding that information, 
by nature, is merely a series of zeros and ones that can be manipulated without 
damaging the medium the data was stored on.84 The court determined that since 
there was not any physical damage to the medium the data was stored on, the loss of 
data was not covered under any of the plaintiff’s policies since the plaintiff did not 
incur a “physical loss.”85  
 In light of the uncertainty of how courts would interpret the definition of a 
physical loss, the ISO decided to modify their standard Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form.86 The new language in the form clarified the definition of property 
damage to explicitly exclude electronic data.87 Shortly after the update to the form in 
 
 80. See infra Section III.D. 
 81. See infra Section III.D. 
 82. See infra Section III.D. 
 83. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc. No. 99–185 TUC ACM, slip op. at 2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 
18, 2000). 
 84. See Ward Gen. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 4th 548, 556 (2003), as modified 
on denial of reh’g (Jan. 7, 2004) (finding that information and data that was lost when an Oracle database crashed 
was not covered under the insured’s policies because data does not have material existence).  
 85. Id. at 557. 
 86. 2 KEN BROWNLEE & ROBERT PERSONS, EXCESS LIABILITY RIGHTS & DUTIES OF COMMERCIAL RISK 
INSUREDS & INSURER § 14:2, WesLlaw (database updated May 2017) (noting that I.S.O. CG 00 01 10 01 (2000) 
defines “property damage” differently than earlier forms). 
 87. See INS. SERV. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY FORM CG 00 01 10 01 (2000) (defining 
property damage under V Definitions section 17 as “For the purposes of this insurance, electronic data is not 
tangible property. As used in this definition, electronic data means information, facts or programs stored as or 
on, created or used on, or transmitted to or from computer software, including systems and applications software, 
heard or floppy disks, CD-ROMS, tapes, drives, cells, data processing devices or any other media which are used 
with electronically controlled equipment). 
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2001, the ISO made another significant update to their insurance policy in 2004 in 
section P (under the exclusions), which tried to exclude the insurer’s liability for 
electronic data.88 
 In 2013, the ISO modified the standard CGL for Section A to clarify that under 
the exclusion P, “Electronic Data,” the CGL would provide coverage for a “bodily 
injury” as a result of the loss of use of data, corruption of the data or the inability to 
access the data.89 However, in the same update, the ISO made several updates to 
Section B of the policy to limit liability related to electronic and cyber publications90 
similar to the mandatory endorsement CG 24 13 04 13.91 Although many of these 
changes were aimed at tightening cyber related exposure to third-party claims, the 
ISO’s actions further reinforce the notion that barring specific endorsements or an 
independent insurance policy, an insured is not likely to find cyber related coverage 
under their CGL policies. 
 To further limit exposure, the ISO issued a series of endorsements, which 
essentially eliminated an insured’s coverage for cyber related events.92 The 
endorsement CG 21 06 05 14 specifically excludes coverage under Coverage A for 
damages relating to intellectual property and third loss or disclosure of third party 
information.93 This shift in coverage under the CGL is logical because when the 
previous versions of the CGL were drafted, hacking and the costs associated with a 
data breach and physical damage caused by cyber related activities was not as 
prevalent and standalone cyber insurance policies were not widely available on the 
market.94 It seems to be the intention of the ISO and the insurance companies to sell 
 
 88. See INS. SERV. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY FORM CG 00 01 12 04 (2003) (defining 
Electronic Data exclusion as “Damages arising out of the loss of, loss of use of, damage to, corruption of, inability 
to access, or inability to manipulate electronic data. As used in this exclusion, electronic data means information, 
facts or programs stored as or on, created or used on, or transmitted to or from computer software, including 
systems and applications software, hard or floppy disks, CD-ROMS, tapes, drives, cells, data processing devices 
or any other media which are used with electronically controlled equipment.”). 
 89. INS. SERV. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM CG 00 01 04 13 § I.A. (2012). 
 90. Id. at § I.B.  
 91. INS. SERV, OFFICE, INC., AMENDMENT OF PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY DEFINITION CG 24 13 04 
13 (2012) (this endorsement modified the “personal and advertising injury” definition to remove coverage for 
“oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.”). 
 92. ISO Comments on CGL Endorsements for Data Breach Liability Exclusions, INS. J. (July 18, 2014), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2014/07/18/332655.htm. 
 93. See INS. SERV. OFFICES, INC., EXCLUSION—ACCESS OR DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL OR PERSONAL 
INFORMATION AND DATA-RELATED LIABILITY—WITH LIMITED BODILY INJURY EXCEPTION CG 21 06 05 14 (2013) 
(establishing that “(1) any access to or disclosure of any person’s or organization’s confidential or personal 
information, including patents, trade secrets, processing methods, customer lists, financial information, credit 
card information, health information or any other type of nonpublic information; or (2) The loss of, loss of use 
of, damage to, corruption of, inability to access, or inability to manipulate electronic data.”). 
 94. ISO Comments on CGL Endorsements for Data Breach Liability Exclusions, INS. J. (July 18, 2014), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2014/07/18/332655.htm.   
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separate standalone cyber insurance products that can better address an insured’s 
need for cyber related insurance.95 The ISO recently produced an insurance policy, 
Information Security Protection Policy, (EC 00 10 01 14), aimed at addressing eight 
separate insuring categories: (1) security breach expense; (2) security breach liability; 
(3) replacement or restoration of electronic data; (4) business income and extra 
expense; (5) extortion threats; (6) public relations expense; (7) website publishing 
liability; and (8) programming errors and omissions liability.96 Although the ISO has 
promulgated this new cyber insurance policy suite, it is unclear whether any 
insurance companies are utilizing the forms and if so, to what extent. 
IV. INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE MARKETS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO 
ABSORB LOSSES FROM A LARGE SCALE CYBER-ATTACK 
A. A Cyber-Attack Could Cost Over $70 Billion in Insurance Claims 
According to the 2015 Lloyd’s Emerging Risk Report, if there was a cyber-attack on 
the U.S. power grid, it could potentially cost the U.S. economy more than $1 trillion 
dollars and cost insurance companies over $70 billion.97 Under one scenario, a piece 
of malware is introduced into the electric grid and overloads the system, taking it 
down and resulting in a loss of power for the northeast between twenty-four hours 
in some spots and weeks in others.98 The scenario illustrates the point that a cyber-
attack can implicate multiple lines of insurance in a very large geographic region.99 
For example, companies unable to function as a result of the power outage could put 
in claims for property loss of perishable items that went bad, lost profits under their 
business interruption policies, and any collateral damage such as fire or vandalism 
that occurred during the power outage.100  
 While the scenario in the Lloyd’s report demonstrates how quickly a single 
cyber-attack can inflict billions of dollars in damage, the scenario fails to fully capture 
the amount of cyber risk businesses could face.101 The real risk addressed later in the 
report is that the cyber risk itself is not constrained by physical boundaries and can 
easily be scaled and orchestrated with a couple lines of malicious code.102 However, 
 
 95. Id.  
 96. VERISK INS. SOL., ISO’S CYBER INSURANCE PROGRAM 1 (2016), http://www.verisk.com/ downloads/iso-
cyber-insurance-program.pdf. 
 97. LLOYDS, EMERGING RISK REPORT – 2015: SOCIETY & SECURITY: BUSINESS BLACKOUT 4 (2015), https:// 
www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/news-and-insight/risk-insight/2015/business-blackout/business-
blackout20150708.pdf [hereinafter LLOYDS, SOCIETY & SECURITY]. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. LLOYDS, SOCIETY & SECURITY, supra note 97Error! Bookmark not defined., at 25. 
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the report tries to down play the risk too much when it claims that there are many 
barriers that impede bad cyber actors such as fear of retribution and the resources 
needed to orchestrate the attack.103  
B. Banks Need to Invest in Cyber Security Guards  
Bank and cyber-currency exchange platforms are prime targets for cyber bank 
robbers.104 According to Kaspersky Lab, it has direct knowledge of over $300 million 
in cyber thefts but believes the actual amount could be triple that amount (over $1 
billion) just in 2015.105 In another attack in 2016, over $81 million dollars were 
siphoned from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.106 With the rise of digital 
currencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, hackers are raiding Bitcoin exchanges and 
stealing hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of the digital currencies.107 Meanwhile, 
bank robbers who went in-person to bank locations and took physical money were 
only able to haul in about $9.5 million in 2009 and around $38 million in 2011 from 
over 5,000 robberies.108   
C. Basic Elements of Insurance Risk Diversification 
Based on the nature of cyber events, an exploited vulnerability could have a massive 
cascading effect causing trillions in insured losses.109 This poses a significant 
challenge to insurance companies attempting to underwrite cyber insurance policies 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. LLOYDS, EMERGING RISK REPORT – 2015: BITCOIN: RISK FACTORS FOR INSURANCE (2015), https:// 
www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/news-and-insight/risk-insight/2015/bitcoin—final.pdf.  
 105. David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Bank Hackers Steal Millions via Malware, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/world/bank-hackers-steal-millions-via-malware.html. 
 106. Michael Corkery, Hackers’ $81 Million Sneak Attack on World Banking, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/01/business/dealbook/hackers-81-million-sneak-attack-on-world-banking. 
html. 
 107. Luke Graham, $32 Million Worth of Digital Currency Ether Stolen by Hackers, CNBC (July 20, 2017, 7:41 
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/20/32-million-worth-of-digital-currency-ether-stolen -by-hackers.html; 
Bloomberg, Ethereum Bandits Stole $225 Million This Year, FORTUNE (Aug. 28, 2017), http://fortune.com/ 
2017/08/28/ethereum-cryptocurrency-stolen-bitcoin/. 
 108. Brian Krebs, Cyber Crooks Leave Traditional Bank Robbers in the Dust, KREBS ON SECURITY (Mar. 9, 
2010), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/03/cyber-crooks-leave-bank-robbers-in-the-dust/; Bank Crime 
Statistics 2011, FBI (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/bank-crime-statistics-
2011/bank-crime-statistics-2011. 
 109. LLOYDS, SOCIETY & SECURITY, supra note 97, at 4 (noting that the cost insured cost could range from 21 
to 71 billion in the example used while costing the economy up to $1 trillion in economic damage); see also Steve 
Morgan, Cyber Crime Costs Projected To Reach $2 Trillion by 2019, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2016, 11:01 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/01/17/cyber-crime-costs-projected-to-reach-2-trillion-by-
2019/#5cc5ee0b3a91 (projecting that the costs of data breaches will be $2.1 trillion by 2019).  
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because of the potential “lumpiness” of the claims related to a catastrophic loss.110 
Insurance companies have developed sophisticated modeling tools and can generally 
anticipate losses related to natural disasters, but several insurance companies have 
been caught off-guard by disasters, such as the losses related to Hurricane Katrina, 
which accounted for over $38 billion in insured losses and caused the fourth largest 
insurer in Florida to go bankrupt.111 
 Loss models used by insurance companies for policies such as car insurance, 
life insurance, and homeowner’s insurance, can reasonably predict the anticipated 
loss based on a large number of independent risks, that when aggregated, follow a 
predictable pattern over time.112 However, a large cyber incident could potentially 
trigger all of the cyber insurance policies underwritten by an insurance company, 
irrespective of geographic location, which would create a situation far worse than 
other catastrophic losses suffered by the insurance industry from incidents such as 
Hurricane Katrina.113 A small-scale example of this is the recent exploit Wannacry, 
which was a worm114 that spread by exploiting vulnerabilities in the Microsoft 
Windows operating system and encrypting the files on the system until the ransom 
was paid.115 This incident affected tens of thousands of computers in over seventy-
four countries, which resulted in locking hospitals out of their patient data among 
other things.116 The Wannacry incident demonstrated that even if there is a robust 
re-insurance market, a large scale cyber-attack could bankrupt the insurance 
companies issuing the policies and the re-insurers because the insurance companies 
are trying to issue policies to cover rapidly evolving human created threats which are 
typically hard to model and insure.117 
 
 110. See Patricia Born & W. Kip Viscusi, The Catastrophic Effects of Natural Disasters on Insurance Markets, 
33 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 55, 55-56 (2006) (finding that insurance companies may go bankrupt or be forced to 
exit a market in the face of a catastrophic event). 
 111. Id. at 56. 
 112. Id. at 55. 
 113. See generally id. at 56.  
 114. See Margaret Rouse, Security Search, TECH TARGET, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/ 
worm (last visited Jan. 3, 2018) (“A computer worm is self-replicating malware that duplicates itself to spread to 
uninfected computers.”). 
 115. Lily Hay Newman, The Ransomware Meltdown Experts Warned About is Here, WIRED (May 12, 2017, 
2:03 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/ransomware-meltdown-experts-warned/. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Sam Friedman & Adam Thomas, Demystifying Cyber Insurance Coverage: Clearing Obstacles in a 
Problematic but Promising Growth Market, DELOITTE INSIGHTS, (Feb. 23, 2017), https://dupress. 
deloitte.com/dup-us-en/industry/financial-services/demystifying-cybersecurity-insurance.html. 
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D. Implications for Re-insurance Market 
Another issue facing the cyber insurance market is the risk of a cascading cyber event 
triggering the re-insurance coverage for the insurers.118 Under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,119 states were given supremacy over the federal government to regulate 
insurance. States are responsible for: “(1) ensuring that consumers are charged a fair 
and reasonable price for insurance products; (2) protecting the solvency of insurers; 
(3) preventing unfair practices and overreaching by insurers; and (4) guaranteeing 
the availability of coverage to the public.”120 Under most state regulations, insurance 
companies are required to undergo periodic examination-audits during which, state 
regulators and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NIAC”)121 
examine the insurance companies’ detailed financial records to determine whether 
they have adequate funds to meet their current and future policy obligations.122 
 As discussed above, companies storing large amounts of data could be liable for 
the costs of complying with the various state reporting requirements for data 
breaches, class action lawsuits, virtual bank robberies, and massive cascading cyber 
events.123 In a 2014 Market Bulletin, Lloyd’s of London raised the concern that their 
managing agents may not be properly pricing or adequately quantifying the potential 
exposure in their cyber policies.124 Diversifying the risk in the cyber insurance market 
requires an in-depth scenario analysis of potential exposures due to a cyber-
incident.125 The policies currently in force are not designed for the “Internet of 
Things,” in which a hacking event could trigger overlapping cyber, homeowner’s 
insurance, business interruption and even auto insurance policies.126 
 
 118. See Steve Evans, Cyber Risk Aggregation a Threat to Re/Insurer Solvency, REINSURANCE NEWS (June 1, 
2017), https://www.reinsurancene.ws/cyber-risk-aggregation-threat-reinsurer-solvency/ (noting that the 
Wannacry attack struck computers in over 150 countries and demonstrated the impact that a computer hack 
could have around the world). 
 119. The McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012). 
 120. ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 89 (LexisNexis 5th ed. 
2012). 
 121. For additional information about NIAC, visit http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm. 
 122. JERRY ET AL., supra note 120, at 94. 
 123. See supra Sections II–IV.  
 124. TOM BOLT, CYBER RISKS AND EXPOSURES: REF: Y4842 (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.lloyds.com 
/~/media/Files/The-Market/Communications/Market-Bulletins/2014/11/Y4842.pdf. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. 
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V. BLOCKCHAIN BASED IDS TO REPLACE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS 
A. Social Security Numbers Were Not Designed to Be Utilized as a Secret Code to 
Access Credit Information 
As a result of the numerous security breaches both at the federal level with the Office 
of Personal Management (“OPM”) breach, the recent Equifax breach and other high 
profile breaches, individuals can no longer reasonably anticipate that their Social 
Security numbers will be secure.127 The potential for massive breaches associated with 
the continued use of Social Security numbers is inevitable and it puts companies that 
store the information at risk.128 It also puts consumer in the unenviable position of 
constantly paying for credit monitoring, costs to freeze their accounts, and other risks 
of identity theft.129 
 The current protocol for notifying consumers that their identity has been stolen 
does little to protect consumers.130 In most cases, when a company identifies that 
their customers’ data may have been compromised, based on the state, there are 
varying breach notification requirements.131 However, other than the mandatory 
breach notification, most companies will only offer consumers affected by the breach 
one free year of credit monitoring as a mea culpa for their transgressions.132 
 As a result of the numerous breaches, including the most recent Equifax breach, 
it is almost inconceivable for any regulator to believe that we can continue using 
Social Security numbers as a key data point for allowing consumers to access credit, 
file taxes and drain bank accounts.133 According to the Social Security Administration 
(“SSA”), the Social Security number was created in 1936 to keep track of the earnings 
 
 127. John Carlin & David Newman, The Equifax Breach Proves it’s Time to Stop Using Social Security 
Numbers, CNBC (Oct. 9, 2017, 3:05 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/04/equifax-breach-time-to-stop-
using-social-security-numbers-commentary.html. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Yuki Noguchi, After Equifax Hack, Consumers Are On Their Own. Here Are 6 Tips to Protect Your Data, 
NPR (Sept. 14, 2017, 4:34 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/14/550949718/after-equifax-data-breach-
consumers-are-largely-on-their-own. 
 130. Marc Rotenberg, Equifax, the Credit Reporting Industry, and What Congress Should Do Next, HARVARD 
BUS. REV. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/09/equifax-the-credit-reporting-industry-and-what-congress-
should-do-next. 
 131. Dana B. Rosenfeld, Alysa Zeltzer Hutnik & Christopher M. Loeffler, State Data Breach Laws Agency 
Notice Requirements Chart: Overview, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I1559f980eef211e285 
78f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html (search in search bar for the title of the document; then click on “Practical 
Law”) (last visited Mar. 3, 2018) (providing a detailed chart describing the data breach notification requirements 
by state). 
 132. Rotenberg, supra note 130. 
 133. Id. (noting that the credit records of over 143 million consumers were compromised during the Equifax 
breach in 2017).  
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history of U.S. workers for the purposes of calculating their retirement benefits.134 
The SSA and the Department of Health and Human Services have made it clear that 
Social Security numbers were never intended to be used as an identifier for 
individuals.135 The SSA recognizes that “[t]he universality of SSN ownership has in 
turn led to the SSN’s adoption by private industry as a unique identifier.”136As a 
result, its “universality has led to abuse of the SSN” most notably in the area of 
identity theft.137  
 An alternative method of identifying and tracking individuals needs to be 
established especially in light of the fact that bad actors now have enough data on at 
least half of the people in the United States to steal their identity.138 This sentiment 
has been echoed by academics and even the former Equifax CEO Richard Smith in 
his testimony before the House Energy and Commerce Committee.139 One of the 
most popular options proposed by security experts is to utilize multifactor biometrics 
to verify a person’s information such as voice/facial recognition, iris scans, and 
fingerprints.140 Another alternative that has been proposed is the use of blockchain, 
“which creates a public ledger of transactions.”141 This technology is already being 
utilized by Estonia as the “backbone for a digital ID system its citizens use for medical 
services, travel checkpoints and even for voting.”142  
B. Background on Blockchain  
There has been a lot of buzz around blockchain, and digital currencies that utilize the 
blockchain technology like Bitcoin.143 Bitcoin, and the underlying blockchain 
technology have been touted as a potential market disrupter because it may have 
many more applications ranging from trading platforms, smart contracts and even 
 
 134. Carolyn Puckett, The Story of the Social Security Number, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2009), https://www.ssa. 
gov/policy/docs/ssb/v69n2/v69n2p55.html. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Rotenberg, supra note 130 (noting that half of the US population’s data was exposed in the Equifax 
breach).  
 139. Nafeesa Syeed & Elizabeth Dexheimer, The White House and Equifax Agree: Social Security Numbers 
Should Go, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2017, 7:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2017-10-03/white-
house-and-equifax-agree-social-security-numbers-should-go. 
 140. Kaya Yurieff, Why are we still using Social Security numbers as ID?, CNN (Sept. 13, 2017, 8:40 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/13/technology/social-security-number-identification/index.html. 
 141. Hayley Tsukayama, Your Social SecurityNumber May Not Be Secure. But How Could We Replace It?, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp /2017/09/20/your-social-
security-number-may-not-be-secure-but-how-could-we-replace-it/?utm_term =.ca7bf5d6b5ec. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Alan Morrison & Subhankar Sinha, A Primer on Blockchain, PWC (Dec. 6, 2016) http://usblogs. 
pwc.com/emerging-technology/a-primer-on-blockchain-infographic/. 
DiGrazia_page_proof_final (Do Not Delete) 4/20/2018  7:08 PM 
 KEVIN DIGRAZIA 
Vol. 13 No. 2 2018 273 
medial record repositories.144 The value behind the blockchain technology is that it 
allows participants in the network to confirm a transaction, like a bitcoin exchange, 
without the need for a trusted third party intermediary like a bank.145 This technology 
will increase security because of the decentralized nature of the blockchain, reduce 
transaction cost by eliminating intermediaries, decrease transaction time, and 
increase transparency because the blocks are all public.146  
 At the most basic level, blockchain is a decentralized ledger of all transactions 
in a network.147 The chain is made up of blocks, which are essentially ledgers of the 
transactions that have been cleared and attached to the master ledger and can no 
longer be changed.148 For example, if someone in the network requests a transaction, 
the transaction is broadcast to the other computers (nodes) in the network.149 The 
network then validates the transaction using the underlying algorithm, and once 
verified, a new block is time stamped and chronologically added to the network’s 
blockchain in a way that is permeant and unalterable.150 The blockchain ecosystem is 
designed to be irreversible and auditable in near real time by every participant in the 
network.151  
C. Blockchain as a Digital Identity  
The transition to a blockchain based ID system would perhaps be the best solution 
for a country as large as the U.S. because it would not require the government to 
collect biometric data about its citizens, and it would create an audit trail to help 
prevent fraudulent transactions.152 Additionally, the benefit of using blockchain 
algorithms is that as the technology improves, the algorithm can be updated to keep 
up with the technology.153 Such technology could spark a digital revolution in the 
U.S., allowing the ID to be used to validate digital signatures on documents, prevent 
voter fraud, and provide a centralized record of the transaction.154 One of the biggest 
challenges to the adoption of the digital blockchain approach is the fear that digital 
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records will be maliciously modified or destroyed.155 However, this concern is 
theoretically moot because the encrypted public ledger that the data is stored on 
“cannot be erased or rewritten without leaving a record of the previous data.”156 
Based on the blockchain design, the data is considered incorruptible because it is a 
decentralized and distributed digital ledger that prevents the records from being 
modified.157  
 Companies like IBM and SecureKey have been developing and testing 
blockchain based identity solutions based on a “user centric model, also known as 
self-sovereign identity,” which would allow users to control who has access to their 
personal information and could allow third parties like banks, without revealing 
details (like social security numbers or biometric information) behind the identity.158 
This technology is currently being used in a pilot program by several large Canadian 
banks and has enabled the banks to eliminate the need to check credit scores.159 At 
the 2017 “Platform for Change” Summit at the United Nations, companies like 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Microsoft and MasterCard have worked collaboratively to 
try to develop global digital IDs with technologies like blockchain.160 The goal of the 
UN program is to “enable access to digital identity for every person on the planet” by 
2030.161 The global ID based on the blockchain technology would ultimately reduce 
the ability of bad actors across the world from accessing and manipulating personally 
identifiable information (“PII”).162  
IV. CYBER DATA BREACH REPORTING REQUIREMENTS  
A. NY Department of Financial Services (DFS) (23 NYCRR500) 
New York is one of the first states to implement comprehensive regulations 
establishing minimum required security practices.163 The new regulation requires 
banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions to comply with basic 
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security practices and risk assessment procedures outlined in the regulation to better 
safeguard consumer’s private information and better protect New York’s financial 
services industry as a whole.164 The new regulations force financial institutions to 
seriously evaluate their cyber security posture and risk profile through detailed 
testing, training and planning.165 One of the cornerstones of the regulation is the 
annual compliance representation that the Board of Directors or Senior Officer(s) of 
the Covered Entity are required to complete, certify and submit to the New York 
Department of Financial Services (“NYS DFS”).166 Although this regulation only 
impacts a limited number of institutions regulated by NYS DFS, it is a significant step 
in the right direction to helping bolster the security posture of companies in the 
U.S.167 Commentators believe that other states will follow the lead of New York 
regulators and implement similar regulations once the regulations in New York are 
fully implemented.168 
B. Data Breach Notification Laws 
Most states have enacted security breach law that require the entity to notify 
individuals that their Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) has been 
compromised.169 Currently, forty-eight states and most territories have enacted 
breach notification laws, with only Alabama and South Dakota not requiring 
notification.170 Under most state breach notification laws, there is a safe harbor for 
companies that have encrypted data accessed. Recently, Tennessee passed an even 
more protective breach notification law that requires companies to report breach 
even if the data was encrypted.171 Previously, companies were protected by a 
presumptive safe harbor provision in the state data breach laws that exempted them 
from the notification requirements if their data was encrypted.172 The new legislation 
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could be the start of a paradigm shift requiring companies to notify affected parties 
whenever their data is potentially compromised, whether encrypted or not.173 
 This shift could also have significant impacts on the way cyber insurance 
policies provide coverage and in the case of large breaches, could require varied 
reporting requirements depending on the types of information compromised, and 
the location of the person whose information was compromised.174 According to a 
recent survey conducted by the Ponemon Institute, the average cost of a 
compromised record containing sensitive information was about $255 dollars per 
record and averaged $7.35 million per breach, not including breaches involving over 
100,000 records.175 Based on the new requirements, companies could potentially be 
on the hook for millions of dollars for breaches of records, even if the records are 
encrypted.176 Companies should understand the coverage their cyber insurance 
policies provide in the case of a data breach with the various state and federal 
reporting requirements because in some instances, the cyber insurance policies may 
not provide coverage which would be in compliance with all of the state and federal 
requirements.177 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The IoT has created a world where almost everything that we do is reliant on data 
and interconnected computer systems. The string of escalating cyber events should 
be a warning to business, consumers, regulators and insurance companies about the 
potential catastrophic damage that can result from a cyber-event. However, there are 
several steps that Congress, businesses, and consumers can take to protect themselves 
today.  
 First, companies can develop an alternative multifactor unique identifier for 
consumers to use in place of Social Security number that could use a combination of 
blockchain and/or biometric data.178 Second, Congress must pass comprehensive 
laws that establish minimum data security requirements for any company that has 
access to sensitive personal information, set harsh penalties for those that fail to 
comply, and open the gate for consumers to obtain redress in instances where their 
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PII is compromised.179 Finally, insurance companies can help businesses increase 
their cyber posture by offering more competitive rates to those businesses with sound 
security practices. However, above all else, insurance companies must remain aware 
of the overall potential exposure that they have to a cyber-event due to the 
interconnected nature of the IoT.     
 
 
 179. See supra Section VI. 
